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Abstract: In his recent study, Concepts, Fodor identifies five non-
negotiable constraints on any theory of concepts. These theses were all 
shared by the standard medieval theories of concepts. However, those 
theories were cognitivist, in contrast with Fodor’s: concepts are definitions, 
a form of natural knowledge. The medieval theories were formed under two 
influences, from Aristotle by way of Boethius, and from Augustine. The 
tension between them resulted in the Ockhamist notion of a natural 
language, concepts as signs. Thus conventional signs, spoken and written, 
signify things in the world by the mediation of concepts which themselves 
form a language of thought, signifying those things naturally by their 
similarity. Indeed, later thinkers realised that everything signifies itself and 
what is like it naturally in a broad sense by means of the concept of its 
natural likeness.  
  
1. Introduction1 The medieval theory of signification underpinned the theory of 
truth, which in turn fed into a theory of inference. The theory of signification 
describes generally how words relate to things, and how propositions come to mean 
what they do. But this general description needs a further account of how a particular 
occurrence of a word in a particular proposition is related to which things in what 
way. Only then can one say what has to be the case for the proposition to be true, and 
so determine how truth is preserved in an inference. 
For the medievals in whom I am interested, the signification of words and 
propositions was made possible by their link to concepts. Vocal signs are seen as 
imposed by custom as marks or signs for concepts, and written signs are in turn marks 
or signs for vocal signs, and so indirectly for concepts. Concepts, however, signify or 
conceive a range of objects naturally, not by any conventional imposition. Concepts 
are formed by abstraction from sensory cognition. These medieval thinkers inherited 
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from Aristotle, and took further, an elaborate and rich theory of cognitive powers 
which drew from sensation the whole panoply of cognitive awareness. The common 
sense discovers shape, motion and other aspects of cognition not present in each 
particular sense—separate experiences are needed to discern motion, and both sight 
and touch are needed to learn about shape or figure. An estimative or cogitative sense 
is needed to recognise the hostility of the wolf or the friendliness of the dog, qualities 
not immediately evident in sensation. Further composition and division is needed to 
create further concepts, and abstraction to understand generality. But they were 
empiricists, following Aristotle in believing that all knowledge is derived from the 
senses. “The mind is a tabula rasa on which nothing is at first written, but can be 
written” (De Anima 430a1). The innate powers of cognition were manifold and 
considerable, but no more than is necessary to the empiricist project of obtaining all 
real knowledge through the senses. 
Concepts, therefore, have a natural epistemological relation to the class of things 
which they signify. To call it “natural” means that the concept is linked by a law-like 
causal connection to that of which it is a concept, that causal link being explained by 
the mind’s cognitive abilities. Conventional signs, the signs of spoken and written 
language, in contrast, gain their signification only by being linked by custom and 
practice to those natural signs. They obtain their signification indirectly, in what 
Simon Blackburn called a “dog-legged” manner.2 Their immediate signification, or 
what they are primarily attached or subordinate to, is the concept; thereby, their 
ultimate signification is the range of things to which the concept applies. John 
Buridan wrote, in the 1350s: “Categorematic words … signify things by the mediation 
of their concepts, according to which concepts, or similar ones, they were imposed to 
signify. So we call the things conceived by those concepts ‘ultimate significata’ … 
but the concepts we call ‘immediate significata’.”3 
2. Concepts in Modern Philosophy What are concepts? Nowadays, just as in 
medieval times, it is common to identify them as constituents of mental propositions 
or thoughts. Many mental states have content. They consist in representing something 
as of some character. That content is specified by a proposition. Just as the sentence 
                                                
2S. Blackburn, Spreading the Word, Oxford 1984, p. 40. 
3Johannes Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, tr. G. Klima, New Haven 2001, pp. 253-4; cf. Buridan, 
Summulae de Suppositionibus, ed. R. van der Lecq, Nijmegen 1998, p. 39: “dictiones categorematicae 
… significant res aliquas mediantibus conceptibus earum, secundum quos conceptus vel similitudines 
impositae fuerunt ad significandum. Sic ergo res illas illis conceptibus conceptas vocamus ultimata 
significata in proposito. Illos autem conceptus vocamus significata immediata.” 
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expressing that proposition has structure and consists of sub-sentential expressions, so 
it is claimed, propositions can be articulated into components. These propositions 
have a content which is structured and consists of concepts arranged in a certain 
conceptual structure, a mental language of concepts. 
Concepts are hyperintensional. That is, the criteria of distinctness of concepts is 
stricter than necessary equivalence. For example, the concepts ‘triangle’ and 
‘trilateral’ are necessarily equivalent—anything which is trilateral is necessarily 
triangular and vice versa. Nonetheless, the concepts are distinct. What makes them 
distinct is that one can believe that the one applies to something without the other. 
Concepts map out the fine structure of beliefs. 
The central opposition in theories of concepts is between those who treat concepts 
as mental particulars and those who treat them as abstract objects. What unites 
concepts is their content, and that content consists of a common conceptual structure. 
Without the mental acts of judging, believing, thinking, there would be no content, no 
abstract universal. The nominalist urges that concepts have no existence beyond our 
minds, yet is willing to treat them as a common medium for the articulation and 
expression of those thoughts. The realist, in contrast, claims priority for the common 
medium, construing the private thoughts as derivative therefrom. 
On the common view, concepts are a kind of particular. They are not only mind-
dependent but also private. We may suggest that different people can share the same 
concept, since they can think the same thought—that is, their thoughts can have the 
same content. But all these terms equivocate between a private and a public reference. 
Each of us has his or her own thoughts and beliefs, and we make our own judgments; 
we speak loosely when we say that we share and communicate these thoughts, that we 
can have the same beliefs, and that we make the same judgments.  
The hardest question is how a concept is related to its instances, to objects. Again, 
the popular view grounds this relation in the elaboration of conceptual structure as a 
mental language. As a language, its constituents are signs, and a concept is related to 
its instances as a sign to what it signifies. Just as sentences and words are signs, so too 
mental propositions and concepts are signs, with their own special relation to those 
objects. What is that relation? Contemporary philosophy of mind is predominantly 
naturalistic, so that such relations are to be explained in terms of some natural 
relation, for example, a causal relation. Acquaintance with the object causes the 
formation of the concept, which then becomes a natural sign for it. An alternative 
theory claims that the atomic elements of the language of thought are, in some way, 
innate. Yet that threatens to make their relation to objects mysterious and 
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unanalysable, or at least to require an explanation not grounded in experience. Less 
mysterious is the normal empiricist resort, which is to posit an (innate) faculty of 
abstraction, which responds to suitable input by eliciting the appropriate concept. 
Indeed, it is difficult to see how a naturalistic, for example, causal theory, can work 
without such an inborn ability. 
Concepts play an explanatory role. Intentional explanation of a person’s actions 
needs to relate those actions to the intentions and goals to which they are directed. To 
fill out the intentional nature of the explanation, those actions need to be described in 
terms which relate to the agent’s beliefs and purposes. Thus similar actions can result 
from dissimilar intents; and different actions can subserve similar purposes. The 
theory of content articulates this explanatory scheme into a language of the mind. The 
building blocks of this language are concepts. 
Not only is this conceptual language the focus of contemporary research into 
cognitive science and philosophy of mind. It was also the centre of attention in 
philosophical thinking in the fourteenth century. There is, indeed, a remarkable 
parallel between contemporary concerns and theories and medieval conceptions. 
Perhaps this should not be remarkable—after all, the one preceded the other by some 
six centuries. But the chain of descent is tangled, and there is assuredly no direct 
influence of the one on the other. Some may argue that it illustrates the phenomenon 
of convergence on the truth; others that the same siren voices continue to lead the best 
thinkers astray. 
In a recent study, Concepts, Jerry Fodor presents five theses which together make 
up what he calls the Representative Theory of Mind, which is to form the bedrock of 
his theory of concepts.4 Concepts are mental particulars with both causal powers and 
semantic content. The central task he presents is to reveal the link between these two 
aspects. The first thesis states: 
1. Psychological explanation is typically nomic and is intentional through and 
through. 
Those who deny this are physicalists, who believe that one day all will be stateable in 
the language of physics. The medieval conception was definitely on Fodor’s side. 
2. “Mental representations” are the primitive bearers of intentional content. 
That is, the mental realm is prior to, and explanatory of, the vocal and written realm. 
The medievals would heartily agree. 
                                                
4Fodor, Concepts: where cognitive science went wrong, Oxford 1998, especially pp. 7 ff. 
5 
3. Thinking is computation. 
Fodor makes much here of Turing’s analysis of the notion of effective computation. 
The crux seems to be, however, that Turing treated mental representations as symbols. 
We will see in §3 that this was the revolutionary insight of the thirteenth century 
which produced the flowering of semantic theory in the fourteenth century. 
4. Meaning is information (more or less). 
The intention is that semantic content follows (somehow) from causal relations, that 
the content of a concept is a result of its causal relationship to what falls under it. This 
is what the medievals articulated in their talk of cognitions “naturally signifying” 
those things which were included in them. Nor were they backward in describing the 
sensory and intellectual mechanisms by which the cognitions were formed, building 
on Aristotle’s discussion in his De Anima and other biological works.  
5. Whatever distinguishes coextensive concepts is ipso facto “in the head”. 
The medievals would agree: if the things signified are the same—where then can the 
difference lie? It must lie in the cognitions—“in the head”. The cognitions have 
different content, but any abstract notion of content is parasitic on the particular 
content of particular mental states. So Fodor shares an internalist conception with his 
medieval precursors. 
Fodor’s main target in his study is to show that concepts cannot be definitions, for 
no such concepts could be acquired—or at least, the primitive basis must be atomic 
and not definitional. He describes his preferred theory as Informational Atomism, 
where the concept x is not constituted by reference to xs, but by reference to the 
response which we humans have to experience of xs. Here he departs radically not 
just from contemporary cognitive science—as he recognises—but from the medieval 
picture. For the medieval conception is through and through cognitivist: there is a 
mechanism by which we acquire the concept of x by experience of xs. The medievals 
received this model from Aristotle. It is a classical, empiricist model. For it is worth 
recognising that the contrast between empiricism and rationalism is really one of 
degree, not of kind. The former announces that all concepts are acquired; the latter 
that some are innate. But each has to modify its claim, the empiricist admitting that 
some “innate” capacity or mechanism (abstraction, induction or whatever) is needed 
in order to acquire concepts from experience; the rationalist that concepts are only 
latently there at birth, and their overt recognition is triggered by experience through 
an appropriate “innate” mechanism. The medievals then are seen as Aristotelians, 
interested in the mechanism of concept acquisition; Fodor as Platonist, interested in 
the trigger by which we respond to experience by producing certain concepts to which 
we are by our nature prone. Fodor describes his theory as explicitly “non-cognitivist”: 
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a concept x is constituted not (as the definitional theory claims) by what xs have in 
common, but by our response to xs—how xs strike us. Only in this way, he believes, 
can one explain concept acquisition. 
Medieval authors show their rejection of such a theory from the start: “First, we 
say that concepts are cognitions”, writes Thomas of Cleves in the first paragraph of 
his treatise on Concepts of 1370 or thereabouts.5 This is not just a pun: concepts for 
the medievals really put us in touch with how things are, and constitute a form of 
knowledge. Moreover, concepts are definitions. The main casualty of denying this, 
Fodor notes, is analytic connection. If each concept embraces others, either as parts in 
a literally combinatorial conception, or as constituted by its inferential connections 
with others, we have an immediate explanation of analytic connections as connections 
between concepts. On the other hand, if concepts are atomic, connections between 
them can only be inessential and by association—a position sympathetic to Quine’s 
notorious rejection of analyticity. 
In fact, both definitional and atomist theories of concepts admit both complex and 
unanalysable concepts. Only a holistic theory (the so-called “theory theory”6) can 
claim that every concept is decomposable. Fodor’s so-called “atomist” theory 
includes molecular concepts like ‘white man’ which conjoins the possibly atomic 
concepts ‘white’ and ‘man’. Conversely, the definitional theory cannot maintain that 
all concepts decompose further, on pain of a regress. The real difference between the 
two accounts lies in their account of concept acquisition and application: what is the 
link between the concept x and xs? For Fodor, it is contingent and statistical; for the 
definitional theory, it is essential—causal and natural. 
Thomas of Cleves devotes several pages to discussion of such analytic 
connections. His analysis suggests a compositional conception of concepts and signs. 
For example, ‘white man’ is superior in signification to ‘man’ for it includes it as part 
of its signification and so signifies more. But it is inferior to ‘man’ inferentially [in 
consequendo] for if there is a white man, there is a man but not vice versa. Signs and 
concepts are constituted by their signification, which results in their inferential 
connections. But the inferential model which in more recent times has displaced the 
compositional model as an articulation of the definitional theory is not in evidence. It 
is the innate capacity to abstract which makes the compositional and definitional 
conception of concepts viable. 
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Thomas’ treatment of concepts, a model of its time, is thus very different in its 
epistemological basis from Fodor’s information-theoretic account. What they share, 
however, is also important and extensive. Concepts are mental particulars which 
provide categories for classification, and they can be composed into thoughts or 
propositions in such a way that the signification of the composite thought derives 
from that of its constituents. Concepts are—for us humans, at any rate—learned and 
public: we all learn them and share them. Fodor describes his five conditions on any 
theory of concepts as “non-negotiable” (p. 23), so it is not too surprising, perhaps, that 
he shares them with Paul and Thomas. But it is important, for it shows how 
contemporary are the medievals’ concerns despite the six hundred years which 
separate us from them. 
 
3. The Boethian and Augustinian Traditions Our conception of concepts and 
content has, as described in §2, an ancestry in the semantic theories and epistemology 
of the Middle Ages, which in turn were inspired by a passage in Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione as interpreted by Boethius. Boethius translates Aristotle’s remark at 
16a3-4 as follows: “spoken [words] are signs (notae) of impressions (passionum) in 
the soul, and written of spoken”;7 and in his commentary he elaborates on the relation 
between written inscription (litterae), the spoken sound (vox), the thought or concept 
(intellectus) and the thing (res) as follows: “for thing, concept, sound and letter are 
four: the concept conceives the thing, spoken sounds are signs of the concept, and 
letters signify the sounds.”8 That is, the letters (in writing) signify the spoken 
utterance, which in turn designates (a literary variant of ‘signify’, perhaps, since in the 
Aristotelian passage they were both ‘notae’) the concept.9 The function of the concept 
is to act as an intermediary, relating word (spoken and written) and thing, for the 
concept is an effect or impression (passio) of the thing in the mind. So, if the word 
signifies the concept by some human conventional imposition, then on hearing the 
word, we will come naturally to think of the thing. For the mind forms a likeness 
                                                
7Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias: Editio Prima, ed. C. Meiser, Leipzig 
1877, p. 36: “sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae et ea quae 
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voces designant, ipsas vero voces litterae significant” (op. cit., p. 37). 
9Cf. E.J. Ashworth, ‘Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the question: “Do spoken words signify 
concepts or things?”’, in Logos and Pragma, ed. L.M. De Rijk and H. Braakhuis, Nijmegen 1987, p. 
208 n. 10. 
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(similitudo) of things by a natural capacity. Whereas different peoples, speaking 
different languages have different words, both written and spoken, the things and the 
concepts and likenesses by which they conceive them are the same. Boethius’ 
translation of Aristotle continues: “and just as the letters are not the same, neither are 
the sounds. But they are signs of the same impressions for all, and those in turn are 
likenesses of the same things.”10 Thus we inhabit the same world and conceive of it 
the same way, says Aristotle; but we speak (and so write) of it differently. 
This is the dominant semantic scheme of the medieval period: words signify 
concepts, which are likenesses of things in the world. But there is a further 
suggestion, indeed, a rather different picture, present in Boethius which was only fully 
elaborated in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. A few pages later in his first 
commentary, Boethius writes: “for the spoken sound and the concept of the thing 
signify the same thing.”11 The spoken sound signifies both the concept and the thing 
in the world. When we say ‘stone’, we signify first the thought or concept of stone 
and secondarily the stone itself. But in his second commentary, Boethius draws back 
from this conception, declaring that “although sounds are names of things, but we 
don’t use sounds in this way to signify things, but [to signify] those impressions of 
things in the soul which are within us.”12 That is, although spoken sounds are names 
of things and are so by virtue of signifying (by convention) their corresponding 
concepts (passiones animae), the vocal utterance does not itself in any way signify the 
thing conceived. For Aristotle had not expressed it in that way.  
Equally influential, however, if not more so, was a passage in Augustine’s De 
Doctrina Christiana, where Augustine defines ‘sign’: “for the sign is something 
beyond the object which acts on the senses making something else come into 
thought.”13 There is explicit reference to this definition in, for example, the 
                                                
10“et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaedem, sic nec voces eaedem. Quorum autem haec 
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(Boethius, op. cit., p. 36). 
11“vox enim et intellectum rei significat et ipsam rem” (Boethius, op. cit., p. 40). 
12Boethius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Peri Hermeneias: Editio Secunda, ed. C. Meiser, 
Leipzig 1880, p. 41: “licet voces rerum nomina sint, tamen non idcirco utimur vocibus, ut res 
significemus, sed ut eas quae ex rebus nobis innatae sunt animae passiones.” 
13Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, ed. R.P.H. Green, Oxford 1995, II I 1, p. 56: “signum est enim 
res praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire”. 
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Commentary on Priscian Major ascribed to Robert Kilwardby,14 and an implicit one 
in William of Ockham’s Summa Logicae I 1,15 and many other places. However, the 
Augustinian account differs from Boethius’ in two important respects. First, what is 
signified is the thing—as brought out by Augustine’s examples: a footprint is a sign 
of a foot; and ‘cow’ signifies cows (op.cit. II X 15)—in both cases because the sign 
brings the object to mind. Secondly, the sign is required to act on the senses, whether 
visually, or aurally, or through one of the other senses (cf. II III 4). 
The first of these differences takes further the idea that we saw Boethius toyed 
with in his first commentary, that names signify those things of which they are names. 
To be sure, they do so through the mediation of a concept or act of mind. That mental 
act is vital to Augustine’s semiotics; but it is not itself signified by the sign. Rather, he 
speaks of the sign “showing” (demonstrare) what is in the mind: “Conventional signs 
are those which living things give to each other, in order to show … their mental 
state, or what they have sensed or thought.”16 The spoken and written word serves to 
convey from one mind to another these thoughts or emotions (motus animi). But in 
the Augustinian account, words signify what they name—the things we talk about. 
The question, whether words signify concepts or things, came to the fore in the 
mid-thirteenth century. Roger Bacon speaks of a great debate on the subject,17 as does 
John Duns Scotus some years later.18 Besides the authority of Aristotle via 
Boethius—and what Aristotle meant is open to interpretation—arguments on each 
side can be given. For example, if words signified things, would empty names not 
then become impossible?19 On the other hand, when I say that Socrates runs, I mean 
that Socrates himself runs, not that some image or concept in the mind runs (or 
                                                
14K.M. Fredborg et al., ‘The Commentary on “Priscianus Maior” ascribed to Robert Kilwardby’, 
Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin 15, 1975, p. 1. 
15G. de Ockham, Summa Logicae, ed. P. Boehner et al., St Bonaventure 1974, p. 9. 
16Augustine, op cit. (II II 3): “Data vero signa sunt quae sibi quaeque viventia invicem dant ad 
demonstrandos quantum possunt motus animi sui vel sensa aut intellecta quaelibet”. 
17R. Bacon, De Signis, ed. K.M. Fredborg et al., in ‘An inedited part of Roger Bacon’s Opus maius: De 
signis’, Traditio 34, 1978,  p. 132. 
18J. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d 27 ad 1am, ed. Balic, Vatican City 1963, vol. 6, p. 97. 
19Cf. (ps.-)Kilwardby, ed. Fredborg et al., op.cit., §2.1.7 (p. 67) and §2.1.9 (p. 71). 
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images running in the mind).20 Bacon was only one among many, e.g., Peter of 
Auvergne, Peter of Cornwall and (ps-)Kilwardby, to extend what is signified from 
concepts to things.21  
In tandem with this change in what was signified (things, not concepts) went 
another, but this time one to which the Augustinian formula was antithetical, in its 
further requirement that the sign affect the senses in some way. If the word (spoken or 
written) signifies the thing by virtue of its connection to the concept, what is the right 
account of the connection of concept and thing? The big idea, which was to produce a 
huge theoretical development in the fourteenth century, was to suggest that the 
concept itself is a sign. This was the major original contribution of the thirteenth 
century, prefigured in Boethius but contrary to the Augustinian inheritance. For it 
goes directly against Augustine’s suggestion that the concept is invoked as 
intermediary by the operation of the sign on the senses: concepts are insensible; but in 
the Boethian tradition, although the concept is what is signified by the spoken sound, 
there is a suggestion that it itself signifies. Boethius writes: “of which therefore there 
are these four: letters, sounds, concepts, things, and most closely and principally 
letters signify verbs and names. These in turn principally and truly designate 
concepts, but in the second place also things. Concepts however are significative only 
of things.”22  
The new conception of the signification of concepts is found as early as the Logica 
attributed to Lambert of Auxerre (c. 1240).23 (Ps-)Kilwardby shows how to square the 
new conception with the Augustinian requirement. ‘Sign’ can be taken in two ways, 
he says. In one way, it is material and sensible, and works by its action on the senses. 
But in another way, we can think of it in abstraction from its sensible and material 
aspects—and this is the real subject of the science of signs (op.cit., p. 4). This new 
departure found its greatest influence in the work of Scotus and Ockham. It also needs 
to be squared with Aristotle. Scotus writes: “the concept is a natural sign of its object 
(De Interpretatione ch. 1: impressions [in the soul] are signs of things and naturally 
                                                
20Cf. Bacon, op.cit., p. 133. 
21See, e.g., Biard, Logique et Théorie du Signe au XIVe Siècle, Paris 1989, pp. 33 ff. 
22Editio secunda, p. 24: “cui igitur haec sint quattuor, litterae, voces, intellectus, res, proxime quidem 
et principaliter litterae verba nominaque significant. Haec vero principaliter quidem intellectus, 
secundo vero loco res quoque designant. Intellectus vero ipsi nihil aliud nisi rerum significativi sunt.” 
23Logica (Summa Lamberti), ed. F. Alessio, Florence 1971, pp. 205-6. 
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so).”24 Bacon says much the same: “not every sign is offered to the sense as the usual 
description of a sign supposes, but something is offered to the intellect alone, as 
Aristotle observed, who says that impressions in the soul are signs of things.”25 
Perhaps misquotation is the only solution, for Aristotle goes on to say categorically 
that every name is so by convention, since no name is a name naturally: “I said, 
‘according to convention’, for nothing is naturally a name but only when it is a 
sign.”26 The way was now clear for Ockham to open his Summa Logicae with the 
words: “a concept-term is an concept or impression in the soul signifying or 
consignifying something naturally”.27 In doing so, he refers explicitly to Boethius and 
to Augustine. 
 
4. Mental Language The seeds were sown in Boethius’ commentary on Aristotle; 
they were nurtured and developed in the thirteenth century discussions of the sign; but 
the full theory of a language of concepts, a mental language, found its most famous, 
or notorious exponent in the fourteenth century, namely, William of Ockham. A 
further inspiration for Ockham, and others, was Augustine’s image, in his De 
Trinitate, of an inner language. For Ockham, this finally broke the most important 
link in the Aristotelian chain, between spoken word and concept. Ockham no longer 
describes this as a link of signification. Rather, the spoken word is subordinated to the 
corresponding mental word, and the spoken proposition is subordinated to the mental 
proposition. The mental word is a concept, a mental item fitted for inclusion in a 
mental proposition. This is the primary language, what naturally has signification. 
The spoken word and spoken proposition pick up this signification derivatively and 
secondarily by corresponding to these mental items: “these concept-terms and 
propositions composed of them are those mental words which exist only in the mind 
and cannot be revealed externally, whereas sounds as signs subordinate to them can 
                                                
24J. Duns Scotus, Quaestiones subtillisimae super libros Metaphysicas Aristotelis, lib. VI quaestio III, 
Opera Omnia, Paris 1893, vol. 7, p. 334a: “intellectio, ut est obiecti, est signum naturale eius (I. Peri 
Hermeneias: ‘passiones sunt notae rerum’ et hoc naturaliter).” 
25Bacon attributes the doctrine to Aristotle, too: “non omne signum offertur sensui ut vulgata descriptio 
signi supponit, sed aliquod soli intellectui offertur, testante Aristotele, qui dicit passiones animae esse 
signa rerum.” De Signis, ed.cit., p. 82. 
26Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 16a26. Cf. Boethius, op.cit., Editio prima, p. 50: “secundum placitum 
vero, quoniam naturaliter nominum nihil est, sed quando fit nota”. 
27Ockham: “terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans vel 
consignificans” (op.cit. I 1). 
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be pronounced publicly.”28  “It is clear that to every true or false spoken utterance 
there corresponds a mental proposition composed of concepts.”29 
Language is three-fold: written, spoken and mental, but the focus is on mental 
language. Mental language is common to all, whereas written and spoken languages 
differ between different peoples, as Aristotle had observed. Mental language provides 
a “universal semantics”,30 a natural medium whose properties of signification arise 
naturally by a causal process. Having a certain concept is not independent of having 
certain linguistic abilities; it is an ability to exercise those concepts which confers on 
written and spoken utterances the signification which they have. 
The mental language serves to explain many philosophical and semantic 
phenomena. The presence of the mental proposition distinguishes meaningful 
utterances from mere parrotting—the parrot who recites “Daisy, daisy” is not 
accompanying the sounds with the appropriate mental commentary. The mental term 
or concept serves to disambiguate vocal terms, e.g., ‘canis’, the much-used example, 
which can mean ‘dog’, ‘dog-fish’ or ‘dog-star’. The concept also unites different 
utterances from different languages, so that, e.g., ‘canis’ and ‘dog’ are marks of the 
same mental item, and so are appropriate translations—the Aristotelian diversity is 
united in the mental identity. The concept and the mental proposition provide 
intensionality where the shift to things as what is signified might threaten to remove 
it. To take a modern example, ‘renate’ and ‘cordate’ will for Ockham signify the same 
things, those creatures which have a kidney and those which have a heart, since they 
are, we are told, the very same animals. Signification, now that words signify things, 
not concepts, is extensional. What distinguishes the spoken words ‘renate’ and 
‘cordate’ is that they are marks of different concepts. What distinguishes the 
concepts?—their make-up. Simple concepts can be distinguished only in what they 
are concepts of, i.e., extensionally. So ‘renate’ and ‘cordate’ must be complex 
                                                
28Ockham, Summa Logicae I 1, ed.cit., p. 7: “isti termini concepti et propositiones ex eis compositae 
sunt illa verba mentalia quae … tantum in mente manent et exterius proferri non possunt, quamvis 
voces tamquam signa subordinata eis pronuntientur exterius … .” 
29Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem, ed. J. Wey, St Bonaventure 1980, V quaestio 8, p. 509: “Patet … quod 
omni orationi vocali verae et falsae correspondet aliqua propositio mentalis composita ex conceptibus.” 
30The phrase is Nuchelmans’: see G. Nuchelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanistic Theories of the 
Proposition, Amsterdam 1980, p. 4. 
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concepts. The one contains reference to the concept kidney where the other contains 
reference to the concept heart.31 
Once mental language is extended from concepts to mental propositions, new 
questions arise. What is the grammar of mental language? Ockham, and others, were 
fascinated by this question. Ockham’s mental language contains mental nouns, verbs, 
adverbs, conjunctions and prepositions.32 What are omitted are purely stylistic 
features of spoken and written language. So number and case are preserved in mental 
language, for they are essential, but gender and differences only of conjugation or 
declension, differences of verbal form—of synonymous terms, say—are absent. What 
is essential is whatever is needed to mark distinctions of truth-value.33 Synonymy and 
ambiguity are absent from the mental realm, but everything necessary for precise 
expression is retained. 
Concepts are what are apt to be part of the mental proposition,34 so the mental 
proposition is, for Ockham, Holcot, Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen, inter alia, a 
complex. But what provides its unity? This is not a problem specific to the 
medievals.35 But it arises immediately one recognises the propositional complexity of 
the mental. A mental proposition is not just a list of concepts. What gives that set of 
concepts its unity? This problem struck Gregory of Rimini so forcefully that he was 
led to deny complexity and parts to mental propositions: “it seems to me more 
rational to say that such a mental utterance of whatever sort is not composite in any 
way.”36 Peter of Ailly followed him, at least for the case of categorical propositions. 
This doctrine raises its own problems, concerning the relation between concepts and 
mental propositions if the latter do not contain the former as parts. 
                                                
31Cf. Buridan, Sophismata, ed. T.K. Scott, Stuttgart 1977, I conclusio 8a, pp. 27-8. 
32See, e.g., Ockham, Summa Logicae I 3. 
33See, e.g., J. Trentman, ‘Ockham on Mental’, Mind 79, 1970, p. 589. 
34Ockham, Summa Logicae I 1, loc.cit.: “terminus conceptus est … nata esse pars propositionis 
mentalis”. 
35See, e.g., Gaskin, ‘Bradley’s regress, the copula and the unity of the proposition’, The Philosophical 
Quarterly 45, 1995, 161-80. 
36Gregory of Rimini, Super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, Venice 1522, repr. St Bonaventure 
1955, f. 4va: “videtur mihi rationabilius dici quod talis enuntiatio mentalis cuiuscumque generis 
mentalium sit non est taliter composita.” 
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Buridan is one of the few who did not follow the new non-Aristotelian path (we 
think of it as Ockhamist, but it was Ockham’s conclusion which permeated Paris, not 
his works37), retaining the conception whereby the vocal sign signifies the concept, 
and only indirectly signifies res extra, by means of the concept. Similarly, the vocal 
proposition signifies the mental proposition. Paul of Gelria and Thomas of Cleves 
follow this line, perhaps justifying the description of their semiotic as Buridanian, 
since Buridan is the most famous upholder of the Aristotelian conception in the 
fourteenth century. But we still need to ask: what provides the propositional unity to 
that mental proposition? Buridan wrote: “A mental proposition, however, involves a 
combination of concepts, and so it presupposes in the mind some simple concepts, to 
which it adds a complexive concept, by means of which the intellect affirms or denies 
one of those [presupposed simple] concepts of the other … That complexive concept 
is called the copula.”38 Thus the language of concepts also contains a special kind of 
syncategorematic concept, like ‘is’, whose function is to bind with the categorematic 
concepts to form a complex thought, a mental proposition. 
Returning to the Augustinians, Ockham and others who take the mental term not as 
the significate of the vocal term, but as sharing a significate with it, res extra (the 
external thing), we are left with one further puzzle. What is the significate of the 
mental proposition as a whole? Indeed, what is the significate of the vocal 
proposition? A vocal term, like ‘man’, signifies men, by being subordinate to the 
concept man which itself naturally signifies men, and ‘animal’ likewise. But what 
does ‘A man is an animal’ signify? For the true Aristotelians, it signifies the mental 
proposition, but for Ockham and his followers, both term and proposition signify 
some thing in the world. 
There were at least four answers:  
 1) that it signifies whatever its subject term signifies, i.e., whatever the proposition 
is about;  
                                                
37See Courtenay, ‘The reception of Ockham’s thought at the University of Paris’, in Logique, 
Ontologie et Théologie au XIVe siècle: preuves et raisons à l’Université de Paris, edd. Z. Kaluza and 
P. Vignaux, Paris 1984, 43-64. 
38Buridan, Summulae de Dialectica, tr. Klima, op.cit., p. 24. (The final sentence cited is omitted in 
Klima’s translation.) Cf. J. Pinborg, ‘The Summulae, Tractatus I De Introductionibus’, p. 87: 
“propositio autem mentalis consistit in complexione conceptuum, ideo presupponit in mente conceptus 
simplices et superaddit conceptum complexivum quo intellectus affirmat vel negat unum illorum 
conceptuum de reliquo … Ille autem conceptus complexivus dicitur copula.” 
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 2) that it signifies what the categorematic terms signify—so ‘A man is an animal’, 
whether written, vocal or mental, signifies men and animals—this was 
Ockham’s view;39  
 3) that it signifies some state of things in the world, a propositio in re—a 
suggestion of Burleigh’s;40 or  
 4) that it signifies some complexe significabile (a signifiable complex), as 
suggested by Wodeham and taken up by Rimini.41  
 
5. Concepts and Signification The medievals make the traditional distinction 
between natural and conventional signification. Natural signs obtain their 
signification from some dependency or natural relation between sign and significate 
(thing signified). There are many such relations: natural likeness, identity, contrariety, 
cause and effect, opposition, relation of part to whole and vice versa, of one part to 
another, of what contains to what is contained—any real or natural relation of one 
thing to another. This is a very wide definition, and Thomas of Cleves shows by 
examples how wide it reaches. For he appeals to natural relations to explain how a 
term can come to have a secondary signification in addition to its primary 
signification. Thus ‘jar’ comes to signify wine, ‘lion’ to signify a man’s strength, 
‘wolf’ to signify cunning, ‘dove’ to mean simple, ‘Job’ for patience, ‘to plough the 
sea-shore’ (arare litus) to mean labouring uselessly.42 His first example is intriguing: 
he says that ‘mouth’ (os) comes to signify ‘face’ (facies). This happens in the phrase 
‘os gladii’, the face (i.e., edge) of the sword.43 These are all metaphorical uses, he 
says. There are also ironical uses, so that ‘good’ comes to mean ‘bad’, as in “Oh, what 
a good boy he is!” The point is that, however the primary signification is come by 
                                                
39Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, §12.1.4, p. 201. 
40Nuchelmans, op.cit., §13.3, pp. 219 ff. 
41G. Gál, ‘Adam of Wodeham’s question on the “complexe significabile” as the immediate object of 
scientific knowledge’, Franciscan Studies 37, 1977, 66-102; Tachau, Vision and Certitude, Leiden 
1988, ch. 10; Nuchelmans, op.cit., ch. 14. 
42Cf. Ovid, Tristia 5 IV 48: “nec sinet ille tuos litus arare boves”; cf. Heroides V 116. 
43The phrase occurs several times in the Vulgate, e.g., Luke 21, 24: “and they fell to the edge (face, 
mouth) of the sword (et cadent in ore gladii)”. See also Deuteronomy 13, 15; 20, 13 and 17; Jeremiah 
21, 7; and Judith, 2, 16; 7, 17. 
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(presumably, conventionally, in all these cases), a natural relation between the things 
signified transfers that primary meaning onto other things related in various ways—
indeed, practically any. 
Conventional signification, in contrast, results from arbitrary custom or agreement 
in use, and this agreement should be regardless of any natural relation of sign and 
significate. A natural sign is made by nature; a conventional sign is made by free 
choice. This agreement in use means that no further arrangement or convention is 
needed for its signification. 
Two corollaries follow from these definitions. First, a natural sign always 
represents the same thing in the same way for everyone—others things being equal; in 
contrast, a conventional sign will have different signification depending on the 
practices and customs in place anywhere. Secondly, error is rare in the case of natural 
signs but is commonplace with conventional signs. Buridan, Oresme, Marsilius and 
others all have a question in their De Anima commentaries asking whether the senses 
can be deceived about their proper objects: they support Aristotle’s conclusion (De 
Anima II, 6: 418a11) that they cannot be—or at least, rarely in the case of universal 
judgments. But they can be for “special” judgments and judgments of degree.44 
Conventional signs, writes Paul of Gelria, a follower of Thomas of Cleves, can so 
strongly mislead that Jews and Saracens err in what they say and write about sacred 
matters. It is a nice question to ask how the heathens can err in blindness to the 
                                                
44Cf. Buridan, Quaestiones in tres libros De anima II question 11 (ed. P.G. Sobol, John Buridan on the 
Soul and Sensation: an edition of Book II of his commentary on Aristotle’s Book of the Soul, with an 
introduction and a translation of question 18 on sensible species, Ph.D. thesis, University of Indiana 
1984, pp. 167-8): “non videmur decipi quantum ad iudicium generale, sed quantum ad specialia … 
Non enim decipimur videntes coloratum iudicando quod coloratum est aliquid vel alicubi. Sed in 
speciali decipimur iudicando quod est lignum vel lapis, quod est in illo loco vel in isto”; and N. 
Oresme, Quaestiones in tres libros De anima II question 10 (ed. Marshall, Nicole Oresme’s Questiones 
super libros Aristotelis De anima: a critical edition with introduction and commentary, Ph.D. thesis, 
Cornell University 1980): “quantum ad iudicium universale [vel] nunquam vel raro est decepcio.” The 
latter point is expanded in ms. Bruges 477 (which follows Oresme closely: see Marshall, Appendix 2b, 
p. 785): “quantum ad iudicium speciale sensus bene decipitur circa proprium eius obiectum. Patet nam 
visus aliquando album iudicet esse rubeum vel nigrum; vel eciam album iudicat esse remissus vel 
intensius quam in veritate est”—but such a case is set aside as a matter of a common sensible, not 
proper: “sensus decipitur circa iudicium magis particulare, scilicet iudicando quantum aliquid est 
album vel in quo gradu. Et racio est quod hoc est sensibile commune: scilicet iudicare de quantitate 
sive extensiva sive intensiva.” (p. 294) 
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shining truth of Christianity—but to suggest it is because of their heathen tongue adds 
insult to injury.45 
Thomas Maulfelt, Albert of Saxony and others in the middle and late fourteenth 
century distinguish among natural signs those signifying naturally and properly 
(proprie) and those signifying naturally but in a broad sense (communiter): “Some 
concepts signify themselves naturally in a broad sense and also what is similar to 
them, as this concept ‘man’ or similar ones. Some concepts signify themselves 
naturally and properly, like the concepts quality, being and that sort … Hence every 
concept standing in a mental proposition for what it naturally and broadly signifies 
supposits materially.”46 Concepts of things signify them naturally; they are 
significations representing them. Other signs do not signify formally by themselves, 
so they are not significations, but only naturally in the broad sense, or else 
conventionally. Concepts signify immediately or directly; these signs signifying in the 
broad sense rely on a further relation of natural and proper signification. An example 
                                                
45Note that shortly before Paul was writing, the French Parlement had declared (1374): “Certa 
sententia seu excommunicatio, quam Judaei inter se vocant Niduy … Nostra curia inhibet expresse … 
Judaeis omnibus … ne ipsi de cetero in regno nostro Franciae utantur dictis sententiis seu 
pronuntiationibus de niduy, samatha et de herem inter eos”; and only ten years earlier, King Charles 
had said: “si aliquis a secta Judaica vellet recedere, spiritu illuminatus divino, ac limitibus erroris 
derelictus, fidei orthodoxae sacrique baptismatis reciperet sacramenta, quae praehabebat nudaretur 
omnino … unde accidebat, quod tales, qui antea se locupletes cernebant, egeni, et quidam ex eis vitam 
quasi quaererent mendicantium…”. See Charles Dufresne, Dominus Du Cange, Glossarium novum ad 
scriptores mediae aevi, Paris 1766, vol. III, col. 24. 
46The distinction is found in the Suppositiones treatise of Thomas Maulfelt (Edinburgh ms. 138, f. 63r): 
“quidam conceptus significat se communiter naturaliter vel etiam suum simile ut iste conceptus homo 
vel consimilis.  Quidam conceptus significat se naturaliter proprie ut isti conceptus qualitas, ens et 
huiusmodi … Omnis igitur conceptus stans in propositione mentali pro isto quod significat naturaliter 
communiter supponit materialiter. Exemplum ut homo est conceptus anime mee, posito quod sic 
intelligam.  Sed si conceptus propositionis supponit pro isto quod naturaliter proprie representat dicitur 
supponere personaliter, ut in exemplo qualitas concipitur a me.” Cf. anon. ms. BJ 686 f. 22vb: 
“Thomas de Clivis ponit … terminus stat pro isto quod significat naturaliter communiter, et sic dicitur 
supponere materialiter.” (See E.P. Bos, Logica modernorum in Prague about 1400, Leiden 2004, 
Appendix I.1, p. 438.) See also Albert of Saxony, Perutilis Logica, tr. 2 ch. 3, ed. C. Kann, Die 
Eigenschaften der Termini, Leiden 1994, pp. 174-5. John of Holland contrasts proper natural 
signification with “improper or general natural signification”: Suppositiones, in Four Tracts on Logic, 
ed. E.P. Bos, Nijmegen 1985, pp. 12-13. 
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is the concept whiteness: because of the natural likeness between the species (the 
form) and the concept, whiteness (albedo) signifies itself naturally but in the broad 
sense. For a white thing seen signifies itself principally and consequently other 
coloured things falling under the same concept or intention. 
In fact, the same sign can be a natural and a conventional sign for the same things 
but by different concepts. Take the written sign ‘substance’, for example. Clearly, it 
conventionally signifies every substance. Since it is a substance itself, it 
conventionally signifies itself. But ‘substance’ also signifies itself naturally in the 
broad sense, and every sign similar to it. Another example is the spoken term 
‘utterance’ (vox): there is a proper concept common to all the spoken sounds 
‘utterance’ by which ‘utterance’ signifies those spoken sounds naturally in the broad 
sense. 
So every sign signifies itself—naturally in the broad sense: “every term and indeed 
anything whatever signifies itself naturally in the broad sense.”47 In addition, some 
signs signify themselves conventionally. But in each case, the concepts by which the 
two significations are enabled are different. The concept of substance is different from 
the concept of (written) ‘substance’; and the concept of utterance is different from the 
concept of (spoken) ‘utterance’. 
There is a further distinction. Marsilius of Inghen, following Buridan, distinguishes 
ultimate from non-ultimate signification: 
“It should be noted that the non-ultimate significate of a term is the term itself 
or one similar or equivalent to it, since first, a term always represents itself 
and those similar to it to the intellect, whence it points out its ultimate 
significate to the intellect, namely, the external thing for which such a term is 
said to stand significatively … Its ultimate significate is the external thing 
which such a term signifies if it is spoken or written, and is its natural likeness 
if it is a mental term.”48 (loc.cit.) 
                                                
47See, e.g., Johannes Dorp, Perutile Compendium totius logicae Joannis Buridani cum praeclarissima 
solertissimi viri Joannis Dorp expositione, Venice 1499, repr. Frankfurt am Main 1965, sig. h4vb: 
“quilibet terminus similiter quelibet res mundi significat se naturaliter communiter”; cf. Peter of Ailly, 
Concepts and Insolubles, tr. P.V. Spade, Dordrecht 1980, §60, p. 28. 
48Marsilius of Inghen, Suppositiones, in Treatises on the Properties of Terms, ed. and tr. E. Bos, Reidel 
1983, p. 54: “Notandum quod significatum termini non ultimatum vocatur ipse terminusmet aut sibi 
similis aut equivalens, cum primo semper terminus se ipsum et sibi similem intellectui representet, 
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Note that not only mental terms but also spoken and written terms have non-ultimate 
signification.  
The notion of broad natural signification is, however, not found in Marsilius. The 
two notions are brought together, perhaps for the first time, in Peter of Ailly’s treatise 
on Concepts, written only a few years later, in Paris in the early 1370s.49 But Peter 
makes an important new observation. “To signify naturally,” he observes, “may be 
taken in two senses: in a proper sense and in a general sense,” (§32) as Spade renders 
‘significat naturaliter communiter’, which I rendered above as “broad” natural 
signification. To signify naturally in this broad or general sense is “to represent not by 
itself, but by means of something else, something to a cognitive power by vitally 
changing [that power]. And this pertains to any thing whatever. For any thing is by its 
nature apt to cause a concept of itself in an intellective power … From this it follows 
that every thing signifies or is apt to signify itself naturally in a general sense,” (§33) 
i.e., broadly. That everything signifies itself naturally in the broad sense is a crucial 
observation. 
Consequently, corresponding to a spoken sign, like ‘homo’, there are two concepts. 
(§63) There is the concept of man which it signifies by convention non-ultimately, 
which properly and naturally signifies men, who are the ultimate significates of the 
spoken sign. In addition, there is the concept of the sound ‘homo’, which naturally 
and properly signifies the sound ‘homo’, and by means of which the sound ‘man’ 
broadly and naturally signifies itself, and by which it is its own non-ultimate 
significate. Ailly notes that in the latter case, “some people say it has material 
supposition”. Thus he is aware of Marsilius’ view: “when a spoken term … supposits 
or is taken for itself, it is taken for a non-ultimate significate.” (§67) 
The ultimate significates of ‘man’ are men; the non-ultimate significates of the 
term are itself and other similar terms. But we have to be careful here in capturing the 
medievals’ manifold use of the term ‘ultimate’. The vocal term ‘man’ signifies non-
ultimately (and conventionally) the ultimate concept of man. It signifies ultimately 
                                                                                                                                      
deinde significatum intellectui ostendit suum ultimatum, scilicet rem extra pro qua talis terminus 
dicitur stare significative. Exempli gratia: significatum non ultimatum istius termini homo est ipsemet 
aut sibi similis aut equivalens. Sed significatum ultimatum est ipsa res extra, sicut animal rationale 
mortale, quia ultimate rem extra significat. Et ideo breviter: significatum ultimatum termini est res 
extra quam talis terminus ex impositione significat si sit vocalis vel scriptus, et est eius naturalis 
similitudo si sit terminus mentalis. Significatum non ultimatum dicitur ipsemet terminus vel sibi 
equivalens.”  
49Tr. Spade, Concepts and Insolubles, op.cit. 
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(and conventionally) men. And it signifies itself naturally in the broad sense 
(naturaliter communiter) and is its non-ultimate significate. Indeed, as we saw, 
anything whatever signifies itself naturally in the broad sense. Moreover, ‘man’ also 
signifies terms similar to it in this way.  
These reflections lead to an at first glance surprising consequence: every 
conventionally significative sign corresponds to at least four significates, namely, two 
concepts and two (classes of) things conceived by those concepts. For each spoken 
and written term, as we have seen, corresponds both to a concept embracing its 
primary (ultimate) signification and to a further concept embracing the class of that 
term and its natural likenesses. For example, a clock or bell signifies to its hearer the 
concept of bell, and so itself, and also the concept of time, and so in turn the actual 
hour of matins, or dinner or singing Compline [completorium]50 or for reading. In the 
case of the vocal term ‘man’, it is subordinate to the concept naturally embracing the 
vocal terms ‘man’, thereby signifies itself and other terms like it, further 
conventionally corresponds to the concept of man (the natural likeness of men), and 
finally conventionally signifies its ultimate significates, men like Plato and Socrates. 
Here matters become delightfully complex: perhaps it is time for a diagram. (See 
Figure I.) Here the concept by which a conventionally signifying term naturally 
signifies in the broad sense (the concept of terms like it) corresponds to the concept 
by which that term was imposed to signify conventionally, namely, the concept or 
cognition of those things which the term ultimately signifies. It follows that many 
mental terms signify conventionally, but not those things of which they are the 
concept—them they signify naturally and properly, for they are cognitions of them. 
 
                                                
50Cf.  Reinardus Vulpe 3, 557, in Ysengrimus, ed. and tr. J. Mann, Leiden 1987, p. 392: “Carmina nunc 
stares ad completoria juxta / Qui tardas demens? hinc eremita sali!”   
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Figure I 
‘Animal’, for example, ultimately signifies animals (black line) by virtue of its 
relation (red line) to the concept of animal, which signifies animals naturally and 
properly (yellow line). But in virtue of what does ‘animal’ signify itself and its 
similars? In virtue of a further concept, the concept of the sound ‘animal’. In other 
words, there are two concepts corresponding to the vocal and written terms ‘animal’, 
and indeed to every term. Thus to every conventionally signifying term there are four 
things signified, the two concepts, and the two classes of things conceived by those 
concepts. In the case of ‘sound’ (vox), for example, the classes of things signified 
overlap (in the sound ‘sound’ itself)—see Figure II. 
We find the case of ‘man’ set out explicitly by Paul of Gelria, in his treatise on 
concepts of around 1380: 
“It should be noted that to every sign signifying by convention there 
correspond at least four significates, namely, two concepts and two things 
conceived by these concepts. For example, to this term ‘man’ signifying by 
convention there corresponds first [green diagonal], the concept which is a 
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natural likeness of this sound ‘man’, and by means of this it signifies itself and 
anything naturally similar to itself [green lines], and these are two of its 
significates which it signifies naturally. Moreover, there corresponds to it [red 
diagonal] the concept which is a natural likeness [yellow line] of men, which 
it signifies by convention non-ultimately, and by means of this it ultimately 
signifies by convention [black line] external things, namely, men, such as 












signify conventionally and non-ultimately 
signify naturally in the broad sense and non-ultimately
signify naturally and properly and be a cognition of




                                                
51Paul of Gelria, De Conceptibus, ed. Bos and Read, p. 124: “Notandum quod omni signo ad placitum 
significanti correspondent ad minus quattuor significata, scilicet duo conceptus et res illis conceptibus 
concepte. Exemplum: huic termino vocali ‘homo’ significanti ad placitum correspondet primo 
conceptus qui est naturalis similitudo huius vocis ‘homo’, et mediante isto significat se et quodlibet 
sibi simile naturaliter, et ista sunt duo significata sua que naturaliter significat. Deinde correspondet 
sibi conceptus qui est naturalis similitudo hominum quam significat ad placitum non ultimate, et 
mediante isto significat ad placitum ultimate res ad extra, que sunt homines, ut Plato, Sortes.”   
